Traps of Islamic States and Challenges to Target Russian dominated CAR

 

The struggle for dominance in the region encompassing the Turkish Empire, Russian Empire, and Iranian Empire was multifaceted and complex. The Russian Empire pursued a historical policy aimed at safeguarding the political and social stability of Orthodox Christianity, encompassing Romanian Orthodox, Greek, and Slavic traditional values. Concurrently, the Turkish Empire endeavored on numerous occasions to assert its dominance through military operations, while also providing a socio-political space for various sects of Christianity. However, despite these efforts, the ruling elite of the Turkish Empire remained under the influence of Islamic religious authorities.

During the Ottoman Empire's middle period, the influence of Islamic religious elites overshadowed attempts to establish a unified caliphate system across different parts of West Asia. This dynamic played a significant role in determining the governance structure of states within the empire. Furthermore, individual life within the empire was regulated according to Shia Islamic norms and laws, particularly during periods of monarchy rule.

Central Asian Countries Challenges due to Islamic Extremism

Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) fighters, predominantly hailing from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have familial associations involved in funding and militia activities in Syria. Subsequently, they have shifted their focus to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The interplay of sectarian politics and the Central Asian dimension extends beyond mere trans-regional dynamics, encompassing the spread of extremism amidst the declining period of the USSR. Central Asian Islamic culture exhibits influences not only from Slavic cultural growth but also from Marxist philosophy, particularly materialism, impacting living standards. Nevertheless, these influences diverge from the Russian system.

During the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Gulf Monarchies, notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia, pursued policies aimed at promoting Islamic religious ideologies, such as Wahhabism. Iran similarly applied its religious policies in the context of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, providing free-funded Shiite Madrasa education to indigenous students.

Political reasons 

• The ethnic dimension of radical activities has significantly impacted Central Asian governments. Since the conclusion of the civil war in 1997, Tajikistan has grappled with a surge in militant attacks. Official statements from the Tajik government have acknowledged that organizers affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are predominantly Uzbek minorities. Additionally, Turkmen Muslims have been prohibited from pursuing religious education in Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, law enforcement agencies have targeted numerous Uzbek imams for their links to radical Islamist groups. Notably in 2006, the government's actions resulted in the killing of the prominent religious and ethnic leader, R.Q. Kamaluddin.

In Kazakhstan, fewer Islamic groups operate actively, and there is less attraction among Uzbek minorities towards involvement in the Islamic movement. In 2005, the Kazakhstani Government initiated operations against Hizb-ul-Tahrir and apprehended its members. The ascendancy of Islam within Uzbek and Tajik Muslim communities has led to moral and political adherence to Islamic ideologies. To counter the threat posed by radical Islam, Central Asian governments must explore alternative approaches, such as socio-economic reforms, alongside political will and progressive reassessment aimed at challenging entrenched political authoritarianism.

 

Regional Security and Terrorism in Central Asia

 

The security landscape of Central Asia underwent considerable complexity post-2000. The Clinton Administration's policies aimed at exploring opportunities within the Central Asian Republics, particularly regarding their natural resources, added a layer of intricacy to the region's security dynamics. Russian foreign policy initiatives at the time did not fully recognize the potential cooperative advantages with the United States and the West. Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister exhibited a greater inclination towards aligning with global agendas rather than prioritizing strategies to secure the Commonwealth states' cooperative interests.

Simultaneously, several prominent Islamic countries abandoned overt Islamic agendas, impacting the regional landscape. Sunni Islamic organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Islamic Liberation Party) transitioned from being perceived solely as political entities to political parties advocating for the implementation of Sharia law across all facets of life. Their principles also encompassed the establishment of Islamic states governed by a caliphate system. The collapse of the USSR created an ideological void that various Islamist organizations sought to fill. Concurrently, shifts in social order, such as the marginalization of Uzbek minorities across multiple Central Asian countries, facilitated the rise of indigenous Islamist organizations vying for influence.

The organization commonly known as ISIS, or the Islamic State, emerged in the wake of the Arab Uprising, gaining significant control in Syria and Iraq. Following its rise, branches of ISIS also proliferated in Central Asia, a development noted by Russian military authorities. Evgeny Satanovsky, director of the Russian Middle East Institute, detailed in a military review article the growing threat posed by ISIS in Turkmenistan. This resurgence of ISIS in the region cannot overlook the involvement of young Russian Muslims hailing from the North Caucasus and Volga regions. However, due to their Russian origins, these individuals faced limitations in attaining senior positions within ISIS's military hierarchy, leading to inherent distrust between Western Asian and European countries.

 

Russian Security perspective

 As Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu asserted that the number of ISIS fighters has surged by nearly fifteen percent in recent years. Additionally, he officially announced the implementation of active preventive measures aimed at combating trafficking and narcotics production in Central Asian States. Consequently, there has been a twenty percent increase in narcotics production in the region, which has contributed to the funding of terrorist organizations. Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Council of Security, cautioned that over twenty terrorist organizations are currently operating in Afghanistan under the Taliban-controlled regime.

The Russian government's diplomatic efforts to navigate its relationship with the Taliban, which offers protection to fundamentalist Islamic groups, present distinct narratives within the Western world. Moreover, Russia is reassessing its stance towards the Collective Security Treaty Organization due to ISIS's primary objective of actively propagating radical ideology, particularly highlighted after the Moscow Terror Attack.

The escalating racist sentiments among both native Russians and migrant workers from Central Asia have resulted in various incidents of social inconvenience. This phenomenon has also contributed to the development of inferiority complexes among certain groups, thereby creating fertile ground for organizations like the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) to exploit for mobilization purposes.

Analogous to the March 22 massacre, the Islamic State demonstrated its capacity for violence through the 2017 Saint Petersburg Metro Station attack, resulting in the loss of more than 15 lives. This incident has exacerbated xenophobic attitudes towards Tajik taxi drivers, leading to instances where native Russians refuse to patronize their services, despite the heavy reliance of Russian industrial complexes on Tajik migrant labor. Despite the critical role played by Tajik migrant workers in Russian industries, there exists a paradoxical dynamic wherein Russia remains a dependable security partner for Tajikistan, with the Russian military securing the southern border of Tajikistan. However, following Russia's involvement in Ukraine, the Kremlin has gradually reduced its presence in Tajikistan. Notably, Tajikistan hosts a prominent Russian military base due to its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Within the framework of CSTO initiatives, the Mission 2025 against terrorism was launched in 2016. This initiative aims to coordinate joint measures to counter terrorism, including the identification and neutralization of financing channels that support extremist activities.Top of Form The CSTO Secretariat has expressed optimism regarding the potential efficacy of the New York Forum in addressing pertinent issues. Recently, the Deputy Secretary General of the CSTO proposed the implementation of a Joint Action Plan (SAP) aimed at combating global terrorism in Central Asia. Furthermore, he advocated for the establishment of a coordinating council under the United Nations, tasked with facilitating the exchange of information among regional organizations while adhering to both international and regional regulations.

The Kremlin's meta-strategic comprehension holds significant value in addressing security concerns. As a prominent external actor, Russia possesses the capability to employ both incentivizing and punitive measures to manage terrorist operational capacities, as well as to engage in diplomatic efforts to mitigate their influence. However, the key question lies in the Kremlin's approach towards investigating the root causes of terrorism. Notably, the majority of Islamic ruling elites in Central Asian and West Asian countries do not oppose Russia's perspective on regional or international security management.