India-US Defense Cooperation: An inspection


Introduction

Many Americans believed that India's non-aligned strategy equated with an alliance with the Soviet Union, especially during the Cold War. One of America's fastest-growing business partners, Trade volume has more than quadrupled between 2004 and 2008, from just under US$30 billion a year in both directions to US$66 billion. In addition, two-way investment flows have begun. India's direct investment in the Americas has grown by over 60% since 2007 to US$4.5 billion in 2008, according to a report by the Office of the US Trade Representative.

India's nuclear program was the least impediment to US-India cooperation. The US government imposed sanctions on India in the years after its first nuclear test in 1974, drastically reducing its ability to procure nuclear technology, fuel materials, and technical assistance. In 1998, following India's subsequent experimentation, the United States stopped providing direct aid, commercial export credits, and certain technology transfers.

The 2005 Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation India and the United States view each other as on par with their closest allies in terms of security interests. This principle applies to the transfer, trade, research, joint development, and joint production of defense technology, particularly the most complex and advanced technologies, defense goods, and services. The bilateral merchandise trade in 2021 recorded US$113 billion, surpassing the US$92 billion recorded in 2019. The United States is India's largest partner in defense exercises and is becoming an increasingly important supplier of defense equipment. Both nations undertook a strategic discussion in 2009 under the direction of their respective defense departments, and in 2015, this was expanded to include strategic and commercial dialogue between the United States and India.

 

Defense Cooperation

By establishing a permanent mechanism under ICET, the United States and India reaffirmed their commitment to work together to address their regulatory barriers and business and talent mobility concerns. This was announced after a roundtable was held by the US-India Business Council with the US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo on January 30. Accelerate technical cooperation between the two countries for joint development and production, initially focusing on research initiatives. Strengthen long-term research and development cooperation with a focus on creating operational use cases for maritime security and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

On January 31, 2023, the Indian Electronics and Semiconductors Association (IESA) and the Semiconductor Industry Association of America (SIA) jointly announced their intentions to establish a private-sector task force. This will bring together key stakeholders from business, government, and academia to explore near-term commercial opportunities and support the long-term strategic development of a complementary semiconductor ecosystem.

 The US-based defense and aerospace giant Lockheed Martin and the Tata Group have signed a deal to start producing fighter jets at a joint venture in Hyderabad. The order included a set of 29 warships, with the option of manufacturing more ship sets. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2025. The wings are for F-16 Block 70/72 jets and will be delivered to a U.S. factory in Greenville, South Carolina, for admission to the conference. 

Table: 1

 

         India Imports from the United States of Aircraft, spacecraft

India Imports from United States of Aircraft, spacecraft

   Value

Year

Other Aircraft(Helicopters), Spacecraft


   $274.55M

 

2022

Aircraft Launching Gear; Deck-arrestor; Ground Flying Trainers


   $11.87M

 

2022

Parachutes and Rotochutes

   $732.24K

2022

Balloons, Dirigibles; Gliders, Hang Gliders


   $20.60K

 

2022

Parts of Balloons, Gliders, Helicopters, Aeroplanes, Spacecraft


   $66.63M

 

2021

 

Source: Trading Economics, Trade –Indicators, accessed date, 1 5 June, 2023

 

URL: https://tradingeconomics.com/india/imports/united-states/aircraft-spacecraft#:~:text=India%20Imports%20from%20United%20States%20of%20Aircraft%2C%20spacecraft%20was%20US,updated%20on%20June%20of%202023.

 

India imported US$375.33 million worth of aircraft and spacecraft worth in 2022, cohere to the UN's world trade database COMTRADE. India imports data, satellites, and aircraft from the United States. July 30, 2021, the Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Memorandum of Agreement, which was initially signed in January 2006 and updated in January 2015 by the Indian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. The Department of Defense governs the air-launched UAV(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) PA(Project Agreement). By working together to create defensive equipment, the pact represents a significant milestone in the ongoing defense technology relationship between the two countries.

The Aeronautical Development Facility (ADE) at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Directorate General of Aerospace Systems at the Air Force Research Laboratory. Joint collaboration groups in the aviation industry, land, and water technologies have been created under the DTTI to concentrate on shared initiatives in each discipline. Under this project contract, the Air Force Research Laboratory, the Indian Air Force, and the Defense Research and Development Agency designed, substantiated, tested, and evaluated a system to jointly develop an air-launched unmanned aerial vehicle (ALUAV) to develop a vehicle and cooperate with the prototype.

 The Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Agreement between the US Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense was first signed in January 2006 and updated in January 2015  to encompass a project agreement. Concurrence marks an important step in fortifying the defense technology partnership between the two countries through the joint development of defense equipment. Section. 1336. The United States-India Defense Partnership urges the Biden administration to exercise its authority to grant India exemptions from CAASTA  to strengthen the US-India alliance and deter aggressors like China, adopted by votes at the Plenary Session of the National Defense Reauthorization Act (NDAA) as part of a block change.

 

According to Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, India is no longer subject to CAATSA sanctions aimed at imposing restrictions on countries that buy arms from Russia. Both India and the United States are attempting to resolve these differences. The US wants India to invest more money in its military equipment. Despite an 11% decline in arms imports between 2013-17 and 2018-22, India remained the world's largest arms importer during the five-year period 2018-22. In the same year, imports from Russia accounted for 45% of India's total imports, followed by imports from France (29%), and the United States (11%). Without the highest inflation since 1981, the real US spending growth in 2022 would have been significantly higher at 0.7%. In 2022, US military spending was $877 billion, about 39% of total military spending worldwide, and three times more than that of China, the second largest spender.

In 2022, the United States handed Ukraine over $19.9 billion in military aid. This has significantly increased the US annual military spending. India spent $81.4 billion on military spending, 6.0% more than the world average, and it ranked fourth. Due to the imminent danger, India also highlighted the need to increase military spending on its territory, as per SIPRI Arms Expenditure Report, 2022


Geo-Strategic Objectives

The most important goal is to limit China's ability to exert pressure on India and other South Asian countries. The People's Liberation Army (PLAN) Navy is now expanding operations in the Indian Ocean as India is in an ongoing war condition on its land border with China. A small but important part of the Biden administration's larger Indo-Pacific goal is defense and security cooperation between the United States and India. In Washington, voices on the left and right voiced concerns that the value and sustainability of U.S. engagement with India were exaggerated, while security cooperation was bearing the brunt, a pillar of bilateral relations.

The range of priority defense and security agendas must also be determined by U.S. policymakers. Some would argue that realistic expectations are good ideas. By 2016, the two countries openly discussed their desire to cooperate on sensitive issues, such as anti-submarine warfare, and the United States recognized India as an important defense partner, putting it on equal footing with some of its closest contractual friends approved technology transfer mechanism.

 In 2012, at a time when American “interoperability” was a taboo term in popular statements, agreement on basic agreements stalled, and much of the U.S. Launched the Defense and Trade Technology Initiative (DTTI) and promoted an ambitious list of joint exercises, and coordination was stagnant. Defense technology and security bureaucracy have just begun to treat India as a commodity rather than an implied liability, leading to significant confusion between the two countries regarding intelligence-sharing issues.

 The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), signed by the US and India in 2002, quickly collapsed during discussions for the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). After years of relentless negotiations and frantic last-minute negotiations, the LSA (renamed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Understanding(LEMOA) was finally signed in 2016. Shortly thereafter, the two governments finalized the Dispatch Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, followed by a major extension of artificial security to GSOMIA in 2019. The last major agreement, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Intelligence (BECA), was signed in October 2020. 


India- US defense Cooperation: Critical factors

Despite the fact that there has been a bipartisan agreement on the US–India relationship during the past two decades, this worry implies that the past might not be an accurate predictor of the future. The executive branch's arbitrary treatment of allies and readiness to renege on international accords also cause considerable apprehension on the Indian side.

Washington`s worries about the relationship between India and Russia are mostly centered on Indian purchases of Russian weapons. This is partly due to American concerns that purchases made in India support and subtly applaud Russian-nationalist belligerence. Gaining access to, or creating military technology (nuclear submarines and sophisticated cruise missiles) cooperatively with Russia. In contrast, the United States refuses to permit the transfer of some expensive goods to India (such as nuclear submarines) and supplies air defense systems at inflated or uncompetitive costs.

 Additionally, it is formally recognized as a participant in the U.S. National Technology and Industrial Base, giving individuals and businesses the right to provide goods and services to the country’s armed forces. The highest level of discussion would be required to determine if India might receive a similar approach. U.S. export limits would likely be the last obstacle to overcome in any defense innovation collaboration, which might potentially make the whole exercise impossible. To prevent the spread of vital technologies among antagonistic and unfriendly entities, export controls are in place.

For example, occasionally, the highly sensitive nature of the technology under consideration with potential customers makes it liable to the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), which impedes such an initial discussion. This is because the stringent application of ITAR regulations may drive Indian defense companies to seek out non-American defense firms. As prospective beneficiaries of cutting-edge technologies, both American and Indian businesses may face difficulties as a result.

 

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