Hamas Attack over Israel:  A breach of Intelligence or something else

 

Hamas's unforeseen assault on Israel commemorated on the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, is destined to be enshrined as a monumental intelligence lapse. Armed assailants abducted and executed Israeli citizens within the southern border settlements, meticulously documenting their incursion across multiple locations. Unit 8200, known in Hebrew as Yehida Shmoneh-Matayim and constituting the largest intelligence unit within the Israeli military, specializes in the interception of electronic communications, encompassing email, phone conversations, and social media, alongside its focus on military and diplomatic channels.

Hamas insurgents discharged over 40,000 rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel, as reported by the Israeli military on 7 Oct 2023. Concurrently, Hamas combatants infiltrated southern Israel via various means, including land, sea, and air, employing unconventional methods such as paragliders. Notably, they successfully captured several Israeli soldiers in proximity to Gaza. The perceived security threat emanating from Gaza had been relatively marginalized due to the escalating menace posed by Iran-backed proxies in other regions. As Israeli normalization agreements flourished in the West Asia region, Hamas appeared to embody an antiquated ideology, seemingly out of touch with contemporary developments. This perception engendered a deceptive reassurance among the populace. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had operated on the assumption, in recent years, that Hamas, deterred by the potential robustness of Israel's response and cognizant of the prospect of renewed devastation in Gaza, refrained from orchestrating significant attacks within Israel.

A large intelligence group: why critical question

The Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) constitutes the preeminent entity within the Intelligence community. Functioning as a division of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) general staff, IDI assumes responsibility for the comprehensive national intelligence assessment of Israel. Concurrently, the Shabak, also identified as the Shin Bet, operates as the nation's internal counterespionage and counterterrorism agency. The Mossad, leveraging operatives for intelligence gathering, clandestine operations, and counterterrorism endeavors, predominantly directs its efforts toward Arab nations and affiliated organizations supporting Arab interests. The operational arm, Metzada, adeptly executes nuanced actions targeted at foreign entities.

The primary mission of the Military Intelligence Directorate, commonly known as Aman, is to furnish the government and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) with daily intelligence warnings and alerts, particularly during wartime, to safeguard the nation from potential threats. Within the framework of the Military Intelligence Directorate, the Military Intelligence and Cyber Instruction Unit (MICIU) stands out as the most extensive intelligence school in the WANA region, with a growing emphasis on studies related to fundamentalist Islam and Persian affairs. The directorate is structured around three principal units, namely the 8200 Unit, the 9900 Unit, and the 504 Unit. Of these, the 8200 Unit holds prominence for its role in collecting signal intelligence (SIGINT) and conducting code decryption. Operating across various zones, particularly during wartime, the unit collaborates with combat field headquarters to facilitate a more expeditious flow of critical information.

In recent years, Unit 8200 has acquired a degree of notoriety and engendered considerable controversy owing to certain aspects of its operations. This was notably underscored in 2014 when 43 reservists publicly decried instances of unethical surveillance. The exposure of such leaks and ensuing negative publicity poses potentially detrimental consequences for both the Unit and Israel on a broader scale. Specifically, the revelation of certain activities and methodologies employed by the Unit subjected it to heightened scrutiny from internal and external entities. Simultaneously, occurrences of this nature amplified the risk of instigating discord within the ranks of Unit 8200.

"At both regional and international echelons, adversaries and allies of Israel are enhancing their capabilities in offensive and defensive cyber operations. The recent surprise attack on Israel serves as a conspicuous testament to the efficacy of coordination between Israeli intelligence agencies and their external partners, including the United States, Britain, and France. Lack of collaborative effort proves instrumental in thwarting unexpected assaults, exposing covert financial support to entities such as Hamas and other extremist organizations, and effectively monitoring online communications for strategic planning among coordinating bodies and arms assistance, but why did it fail in this case?"

Israel overlooked potential preparations preceding Saturday's attack, encompassing aspects such as planning and stockpiling. Most critically, lapses occurred in the immediate lead-up to the Hamas offensive, during which the fighters were mobilizing and advancing towards border areas that are typically monitored by regular patrols, surveillance cameras, ground motion sensors, and strategically placed remote-controlled mini-cannons.

Hamas communication channel and planning

The militant Palestinian movement, Hamas, has encountered robust Israeli counterterrorism measures, internal suppression from competing Palestinian factions, and global isolation. In disseminating its messages, Hamas employs a diverse range of technologies, although its principal audience remains its domestic constituents. Despite this, Hamas's communication strategies manifest a predilection for both one-to-many and one-to-one communication modalities. These strategic choices are influenced by their governance responsibilities and the exigent counterterrorism landscape in which they function. Notably, the technologies employed by Hamas have applications in both civilian and military domains. Counterterrorism entities are confronted with multifaceted challenges in addressing Hamas, particularly within the realm of information technology strategies.

Hamas, renowned for its steadfast determination and adept long-term planning, has notably honed its ability to adapt to the military challenges it confronts. The organization dedicates substantial efforts to meticulous planning, particularly in identifying vulnerabilities within the Israeli military framework. A distinctive facet of Hamas's strategic approach lies in the establishment of autonomous and complex military communication networks, exemplified by their proprietary battlefield rebroadcast systems. Notably, this initiative incorporates a level of operational security that extends beyond Hamas itself, encompassing even rival factions within Gaza—an unprecedented development compared to earlier conflict instances. The likelihood of substantial deployment of deception tactics, coupled with the element of surprise through attacks across multiple domains such as rocketry and infiltration, further underscores Hamas's evolving and sophisticated military strategies.

Iron Dome and Challenges

Two distinct systems, namely David's Sling and Arrow, have been engineered to address medium- and long-range threats, encompassing aerial platforms such as planes, drones, rockets, and missiles. The Iron Dome system relies on a sophisticated combination of radar technology and analytical data to assess the level of threat posed by an incoming rocket, activating an interceptor mechanism only when deemed necessary. While the initial development of Iron Dome was exclusively financed by Israeli funds, the transition to mass production, facilitated by the Defense Ministry and Rafael, saw the infusion of American funding. In reciprocation, Israel committed to producing 50 percent of the system's components within the United States. The discrete components were manufactured across various U.S. states in 2022, and subsequently transported to Israel for the assembly process. In the recent attacks including yesterday, the nature and range of missiles predominantly launched by HAMAS have had discernible impacts on the immediate threat assessment capabilities of the system and its subsequent data output analysis.

Despite the rudimentary nature of many rockets, often devoid of guidance systems, their sheer volume and cost-effectiveness pose a distinct challenge to the Iron Dome defense system. The economic advantage lies in the fact that a single rocket may carry a minimal price tag, often in the range of a few hundred dollars, whereas each interceptor designed to counter such projectiles is significantly more expensive, costing approximately $80,000. Additionally, the efficacy of the Iron Dome diminishes when confronted with short-range rockets, particularly those within the proximity of 2.5 miles or less, as highlighted by Michael Herzog, a retired brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces.

In the last week of April 2023, a technical issue within the Iron Dome System was identified through an investigation conducted by the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Despite immediate efforts by the IAF to rectify the problem, the resolution was not attained within the subsequent two days, coinciding with an increased launch of aerial rockets by HAMAS. According to the Times of Israel report in August 2022, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had previously asserted a 97 percent success rate in intercepting threats through the Iron Dome system. However, during a surge of rocket launches from Gaza in April-May 2023, the interception success rate experienced a notable decline to 60 percent. This deviation was promptly addressed, and the system's efficacy was reinstated, as determined by the investigative findings.

The Iron Beam, currently under development in collaboration with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Limited, is not intended as a replacement for the existing Iron Dome. The system is specifically engineered to intercept smaller projectiles while deferring larger ones to more robust missile-based batteries. In essence, its functionality encompasses the neutralization of diverse incoming threats, ranging from unmanned aerial systems to rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds, through the utilization of a directed energy weapon with a power capacity of 100 kilowatts or more, including its capacity limitations. Successful testing of the Iron Beam was conducted in March 2022, and projections indicate potential deployment by 2025 as an integral component of Israel's Iron Dome. Remarkably, Israel stands among the pioneering nations globally to achieve success in employing advanced laser technology for the development of a functional air defense system and showcasing successful interceptions in operational scenarios.

The impact of the Recent Democratic Movement

Given the prevailing political circumstances within Israel and the series of controversies enveloping the civil society issues, the potential disruption engendered by such factors is contingent upon the specific context. The ramifications are intricately linked to the ongoing friction between the legislative and judicial bodies, particularly in light of recent clashes that have cast a negative pall. Eminent voices, including multiple former Army officers and leading Israeli intellectuals, have articulated dissent against decisions made during the Netanyahu leadership. Some political analysts posit that this dissent may be indicative of a deliberate political machination, aiming to realign the political agenda towards a more robust state, drawing parallels to the intelligence lapses observed in the United States Central Intelligence Agency pre-9/11. However, juxtaposing Israel's political dynamics against the United States National Security Crisis list is considered an inconclusive and inapplicable point at the regional level.

Conclusion

Significantly, the attack on October 7, 2023, underscores that recent incidents involving Hamas in the preceding months went unnoticed by the Israeli defense forces and intelligence agencies, failing to be recognized as indicative of a buildup to war. This oversight persisted despite ongoing firefights with Hamas infiltrators in southern Israeli communities. The supplementary intelligence available to Israel could encompass data derived from drones, eavesdropping, and satellites, although officials refrained from providing specific details. The potential influence of recent domestic political upheaval in Israel on this apparent intelligence failure remains an open question. Another aspect to consider is whether Israeli-US intelligence agencies are grappling with reliability issues in information exchange, as suggested by public opinions expressed by several former US intelligence officers.